The question that has hung over Tehran since the initial attacks of the real US-Israeli war with Iran is simple: who’s in charge?
Formally, the answer is clear.
Mojtaba Khamenei took over as supreme leader after the death of his father, Ali Khamenei, on the first day of the war, February 28.
In the Islamic Republic system, that position is intended to be decisive.
The leader has the final say on almost everything important: war, peace and the strategic direction of the State.
But in practice, the picture is much more diffuse.
US President Donald Trump has described Iran’s leadership as “fractured” and suggested the White House is waiting for Tehran to present a “unified proposal”.
Unity was certainly on the minds of Iranian leaders when they distributed a message to the population on their cellphones Thursday night saying that “there is no such thing as a radical or a moderate in Iran: there is only one nation, one direction.”
An invisible leader
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since coming to power.
Beyond a handful of written statements, including one in which he insists that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, there is little direct evidence of his daily defense.
Iranian officials have acknowledged that he was wounded in the initial attacks, but have offered few details.
The Recent York Timesciting Iranian sources, reported this week that he may have suffered several injuries, including injuries to his face that have made it difficult for him to speak.
And its absence matters.
In Iran’s political system, authority is not only institutional, but performative.
Ali Khamenei indicated his intentions through speeches, carefully calibrated appearances, and visible arbitration between factions.
That signaling function is now largely absent.
The result is a vacuum of interpretation.
Some argue that Mojtaba Khamenei’s wartime rise has simply not allowed him to establish authority in his own way.
Others point to reports of his injuries and question whether he is capable of actively managing the system.
In any case, decision-making seems less centralized than before the war.
Diplomatic channels open, but only a little
On paper, diplomacy falls to the government of Masoud Pezeshkian.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi continues to represent Tehran in talks with the US.
But neither of them seems to be setting the strategy and their authority is further questioned by the fact that the Iranian delegation is led by the president of Parliament, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf.
Araghchi’s role seems more operational than decision-making.
His brief backtracking on whether the Strait of Hormuz was open or closed – he first suggested that traffic had resumed and quickly backtracked – offered an unusual glimpse of how little the diplomatic channel controls military decisions.
Pezeshkian, for his part, has aligned himself with the entire leadership of the Islamic Republic without visibly shaping it.
Considered a relatively moderate figure, the Iranian president has so far avoided pushing an independent line.
The delays in the second round of talks with the US in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, reinforce that point.
Even when diplomatic channels are open, the system seems unable or unwilling to compromise.
An expanding military field
The defense of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s most immediate source of influence.
But decisions about its closure rest with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), led by Ahmad Vahidi, and not with the diplomatic team.
That places staunch power in the hands of actors who operate behind closed doors.
Unlike previous crises, there is no single, identifiable figure who clearly takes ownership of the strategy.
Instead, a pattern emerges: actions first, messages second, and not always consistently.
In practice, it is the IRGC’s actions – whether in enforcing the closure of Hormuz or attacking targets across the Gulf – that appear to set the pace of the crisis.
Political and diplomatic responses often follow those decisions, rather than leading.
This does not necessarily signal a breakup of the administrative branches.
But it does suggest that the IRGC’s operational autonomy has expanded, at least temporarily, in the absence of clear political arbitration.
Qalibaf steps forward
In the midst of this ambiguity appears Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf.
Former commander of the Revolutionary Guard and royal president of Parliament, Qalibaf has become one of the most visible figures of the moment.
He has inserted himself into negotiations, addressed the public, and at times framed the war in pragmatic rather than ideological terms.
Within Parliament and in conservative circles, resistance to negotiations remains strong.
The hardline message has intensified, with state media and public campaigns increasingly portraying the negotiations as a sign of weakness in the face of the country’s enemies.
Qalibaf’s position is therefore precarious: active, but not clearly authoritative.
The speaker of Iran’s parliament insists his actions align with Mojtaba Khamenei’s wishes, but there is little visible evidence of direct coordination.
In a system that depends on signals from the top, that ambiguity is revealing.
Coherence declared or exercised?
Together, these dynamics point to a system that works, but is not coherently directed.
The authority of the supreme leader exists, but it is not exercised visibly. The presidency is aligned, but does not lead. Diplomacy is active, but it is not decisive.
The military establishment has key levers, but without a clear public architect.
Political figures take a step forward, but without clear legitimacy.
This is not a collapse. The Islamic Republic remains intact.
But it does suggest something more subtle: a system struggling to turn the influence it has – for example, the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz – into a defined strategy at a time of acute pressure.
It can still act on multiple fronts, but it struggles to point a clear direction to its own power centers.
And in Iran’s political model, coherence is maintained through indications.
For now, the system is resisting the pressure, keeping the defense watch on and avoiding any visible collapse despite the increasing pressure.
However, it increasingly raises the question of whether coherence is being exercised or simply declared.
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- “Whatever he does, it seems to be working,” Trump tells BBC after ordering US Navy to fire on Iranian ships laying mines in Hormuz
- “Iran will never give up control of the Strait of Hormuz”: the BBC interviews the former commander of the Revolutionary Guard in Tehran
